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Earnings Management and Privatisations:  
Evidence from Pakistan 
 
ABDULLAH MUHAMMAD IQBAL, IRAM KHAN, and ZEESHAN AHMED* 
 
This study examines the incidence of earnings management around the time of the 
privatisation of State Owned Enterprises in Pakistan during 1991-2005. Using the modified 
Jones model and a sample of large privatisations (minimum US$1 million), it shows that the 
sampled firms experienced increase in earnings, decrease in cash flows, and increase in current 
discretionary accruals in the year prior to and/or in the year of privatisation. The SOEs used 
both short term and long term accruals to inflate reported earnings. These accruals were 
reversed in the post-privatisation period. These findings suggest that managers of the firms 
slated for privatisation were engaged in earnings management to inflate their ILUPV¶ILQDQFLDO
worth to maximise the privatisation proceeds. Hence, we cannot reject the incidence of 
earnings management during privatisations in Pakistan. The results imply that the investors 
should carefully evaluate the to-be-privatised firms and keep in view the possibility of earnings 
management by the SOEs. 
JEL Classification: G14, G34, G38, L33, M41 
Keywords: Earnings Management, Privatisations, SOEs, Pakistan, Accruals 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Earnings management involves manipulation of financial accounts by management 
to present a certain image of a ILUP¶VHFRQRPLF/operating performance [see, for example, 
Healy and Wahlen (1999); Kothari (2001); and other studies]. Financial accounts 
generally require judgment, and thus, provide managers with the scope for tampering 
[Schipper (1989)].  Recent evidence supports the incidence of earnings management 
around a diverse range of economic events [see, for example, Teoh, et al. (1998a, 1998b); 
Iqbal, et al. (2006, 2009)], and for a broad range of incentives during a ILUP¶VOLIHF\FOH in 
both the developed (the US and the UK) and emerging markets (such as China and 
Malaysia) [see, for example, Teoh, et al. (1998); Ball and Shivakumar (2008); Cheng and 
Warfield (2005); Othman and Zegal (2006);  Yanqiong (2011); Ahmad-Zaluki, et al. 
(2011)].  
In addition, compared with outsiders, managers (insiders) know more about their 
business and its relevant risks and opportunities due to the existence of information 
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asymmetries [Myers and Majluf (1984)]. Therefore, depending on the demands of the 
situation, their vested interests as well as the existence and/or the enforcement of relevant 
laws, it becomes possible for the insiders to manage earnings upwards or downwards or 
even smooth them.1 The probability of such an occurrence is greater in Pakistan for 
several reasons, such as the inefficiency of judicial system and poor disclosure standards 
for the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) [Guedhami and Pittman (2011)]. Furthermore, a 
critical event such as privatisation provides strong incentives to managers to either show 
their support (through upwards earnings management) or opposition (through downward 
earnings management) to it. 
One can, therefore, hypothesise that strong incentives may exist for managing 
earnings at the time of privatising SOEs too.2 Such a hypothesis derives rationale from 
the similarities between privatisations and Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), as one of the 
means for divestment of SOEs is through an IPO. Considerable amount of research, that 
tests the implications of earnings management hypothesis around the event of IPOs and 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), has been done [see for example, Aharony, et al. 
(1993); Teoh, et al. (1998); Ahmad-Zaluki, et al. (2011); among others]. However, to the 
EHVWRIDXWKRUV¶NQRZOHGJH this study is one of the few that tests earnings management 
hypothesis around the privatisation of SOEs. Thus, the main purpose of this study is to 
examine if the managers of SOEs manage earnings (upward or downward) around the 
privatisation of SOEs in Pakistan. The results of the study have important implications 
for policy makers and investors in view of the next wave of major privatisations that are 
expected during 2015-16 in Pakistan. These include Pakistan Steel, Pakistan International 
Airlines (PIA), and Oil and Gas Development Corporation (OGDC), to name a few. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the privatisation 
policy in Pakistan, while Section 3 explains the concept of earnings management, draws 
parallels between IPOs and privatisations,  and develops the testable hypotheses. Section 
4 outlines the criteria for sample selection and discusses the methodology. Section 5 
presents empirical results followed by conclusion in the last section.  
 
2.  THE NATURE OF PRIVATISATION AND ITS  
OBJECTIVES IN PAKISTAN 
This paper attempts to explore earnings management around the SOEs 
privatisation, a term defined in Megginson and Netter (2001) DVWKHµGHOLEHUDWHVDOHE\D
government of state-owned enterprises (SOE) or asVHWV WR SULYDWH HFRQRPLF DJHQWV¶. 
Privatisation programmes emerged in the 1960s, with the Adenauer government in 
Germany divesting a major stake in Volkswagen, followed by the massive privatisation 
invoked by the Thatcher government in the UK in 1980s. This policy then began to 
spread worldwide, adopted by the Latin American and European countries (especially 
Eastern Europe). The popularity of privatisation establishes its credibility as an event of 
 
10DQDJHUVPD\XVH µELJEDWK DFFRXQWLQJ¶ >-LDQJ 7@ RU µFRRNLH MDU UHVHUYHV¶ >%DGHUWVFKHU et al. 
(2009)] as possible tools to manage earnings. They may also defer current earnings to future years or recognise 
revenues earlier [Lin and Shih (2002)]. Barth, et al. (1999) argue that managers may have incentives to smooth 
income over different time periods. 
2We provide details of earnings management incentives and the types of firms involved in managing 
earnings upwards or downwards in Section 3. 
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sufficient significance to be studied independently. This unique policy is not specific to a 
region but is present and practised around the world. 
Cameroon (1997) and Kemal (1996) point out that the privatisation policy was adopted 
in Pakistan as an essential component of the structural adjustment programme, when the 
Privatisation Commission (PC) was established as part of the 1988 IMF/World Bank 
structural adjustment package [Cameroon (1997); Paddon (1997)]. Though Kemal (1996) 
claims that there was not much conviction behind its initiation on the part of the government, 
privatisation has continued to persist as a preferred economic policy option despite  
governments  having different ideological hues and political dispensations [Kemal (2000); PC 
(1996a, 1997, 2000); Qureshi (1992)]. The fact is that in Pakistan, international financial aid 
was conditioned on the privatisation and restructuring of SOEs.  Mirza (1995) gives a number 
of examples that highlight the role of international donors in privatisation in Pakistan. 
According to Khan (2003), since privatisation was an imported phenomenon in 
Pakistan, it had no clearly spelled out objectives initially. The government reports on 
privatisation do not list even a single objective until 1992 [Qureshi (1992)]. It was as late as 
1996, that the broad contours of privatisation policy and its objectives emerged [PC (1996b)]. 
According to the ex-Chairman, Privatisation Commission, the government 
programme for privatisDWLRQLVEDVHGRQ³WKHSULQFLSOHRIUHGXFLQJLWVGLUHFWSDUWLFLSDWLRQ
LQFRPPHUFLDODFWLYLWLHV´DQGHQVXULQJ³HTXLW\DQGHFRQRPLFMXVWLFH´ [Asif (1998)].  PC 
VWDWHV³GLVWRUWHGSULFHV ODFNRIcompetition, and poor government management 
of business have hindered economic development, introduced inefficiencies, generated 
unproductive and unsustainable employment, slowed down investment, reduced access to 
services by the poor, resulted in substandard goods and services, and contributed to fiscal 
EOHHGLQJ´%\SULYDWLsing, the government intends to  remove these impediments. 
By the end of May 2011, the GOP had completed or approved 167 transactions.3  
This number also included some multiple transactions for the same unit. The gross 
privatisation proceeds stood at Rs 476.421 billion. Telecom and power sectors alone 
account for around 50 percent of all the proceeds. 
 
3.  EARNINGS MANAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), earnings management occurs when 
managers use judgment and discretion in financial reporting and choose accounting 
methods to structure transactions to alter financial reports. This enables them to mislead 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of a company or to ³influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers´S. Managers can 
exercise their discretion in case of discretionary part of the accruals, which involve 
estimation by the management and thus serve as a proxy for determining the level of 
earnings management [Healy and Wahlen (1999)].  
 
3.1.  Incentives for Upward Earnings Management 
Recent research has identified a number of situations in which firms may engage 
in upward earnings management. These include period(s) leading to equity offerings 
 
3http://www.privatisation.gov.pk/about/Completed%20Transactions%20(new).htm. Accessed on September 
10, 2013. 
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(IPOs and SEOs²Seasoned Equity Offerings), increasing PDQDJHU¶V FRPSHQVDWLRQV
when they are linked to year-end earnings (e.g. bonus plans), and avoiding violating 
clauses within lending contracts, etc.  
Ahmad-Zaluki, et al. (2011) and Smith, et al. (2001) argue that in times of an 
economic downturn, there is external pressure on firms to choose income increasing 
accounting methods. During the East Asian crisis in 1997-98, IPOs recorded a higher 
amount of discretionary accruals than they would have done otherwise. The managers 
were under pressure WRPDLQWDLQLQYHVWRUV¶FRQILGHQFHLQ,32s, which affected the choice 
of accounting methods that showed upwards earnings. Thus, their studies establish a 
positive relationship between upward earnings management in IPOs and the periods of 
economic stress. 
Earnings management is common during privatisation introduced at times of 
economic stress.  Karatas (1995) finds instances of data manipulation in Turkey in the 
pre-privatisation period. Such data falsification is more likely to be present in situations 
where government is facing opposition to its privatisation policy and wants it to look 
good.  
Putting these studies in the context of Pakistan and the period (1991-2005) under 
review, we ILQGWKDW3DNLVWDQ¶VHFRQRP\ZDV not faring very well. Arby (2001) noted that 
the recession in Pakistan started in the early 1990s and was expected to continue till 
2004-05. Burki  (2000) DOVRDUJXHVWKDW³WKHHFRQRP\DQGVWDWHRI3DNLVWDQDUHLQFULVLV«
Pakistan has not faced a crisis of this magnitude in its entire 60-\HDUKLVWRU\´ (p. 152). 
Thus, the economic rationale would dictate that due to the economic downturn and a 
chronic fiscal budget deficit, the government should quickly privatise as many SOEs as 
possible. To achieve this, the government had the incentives to use income increasing 
accounting policies and positive discretionary accruals to achieve higher value for the 
firms, just as IPO firms would manage earnings upward in order tR UHWDLQ LQYHVWRUV¶
confidence and avoid reduced stock trading. In such a situation, managers are expected to 
get along with the government rather than resist and face the consequences of refusing 
orders. The economic incentives apart, the political will behind a privatisation 
programme is also likely to affect the earnings management perspective.  
Yarrow (1999) argues that the most common trigger for privatisation and SOE 
reform is fiscal pressure. This statement clearly applies to Pakistan where the government 
had a clear incentive to use privatisation proceeds as a substitute for taxes and to 
compensate for the pervasive tax evasion. This makes intuitive sense as we already know 
that one of the reasons for the privatisation of SOEs is the revenue that such a divesture 
would generate.4 Weak democratic regimes followed by military rule made it even more 
difficult for the successive governments to introduce a stringent tax system. 
Public debt also provides an incentive for upward earnings management; the goal 
would be to maximise the revenue to be generated from the privatised unit, which can then be 
used to finance public expenditure. In case of debt financing for SOEs, government could 
show through upward earnings manipulation the efficiency of its management.  
 
4Pinheiro and Schneider (1994, 1995), however, show that ownership transfers are neutral from fiscal 
perspective and the privatisation proceeds are often too little and arrive too late to help in times of economic 
crisis. Hemming and Mansoor (1987) and Mansoor (1988b, 1988a) also argue that ideally, the change of 
ownership should have no effect on fiscal deficit due to the fair market price of SOEs. 
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Khan (2003) has also concluded that managers had incentives for upwards 
earnings management to increase the probability of privatisation. This is because after the 
initial shock of privatisation was over, they benefitted both in terms of better wages and 
increased employment opportunities. This is also evident from the study by De Luca 
(1997) and Martin and Parker (1997) which shows that managers mostly benefit from it, 
enjoying better pay and perks in the post privatisation period.  According to Harris 
(1995), they either advocate it or at least show less stress and low uncertainty level 
[Nelson, et al. (1995); Cam (1999)].  
The reasons outlined above provide sufficient incentives for upward earnings 
management in the years before privatisation. This leads to our first hypothesis, 
H1: the management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is likely to engage in 
upward earnings management. 
 
3.2.  Incentives for Downward Earnings Management 
A number of studies on IPOs and SEOs have found a negative relationship 
between pre-offer accruals and post-offer operating and stock returns performance[for 
example, Teoh, et al. (1998a) and (1998b); Iqbal, et al. (2006, 2009)]. This negative 
relationship (or conservative earnings management) can be important when privatised 
firms plan an IPO/SEO in the long run. For example, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) argue 
that the IPO firms which need subsequent rounds of financing tend to be conservative in 
their earnings management practices.  
Another possible reason for conservative earnings management can be political 
dimension normally associated with privatisation. For example, politicians might want 
units under privatisation to be underpriced to gain political favours from investors. Thus 
conservative earnings management (i.e. underpricing) may be used to overcome political 
obstacles standing in the way of a successful privatisation [Megginson and Netter (2001); 
Laurin, et al. (2004);  and Farinos, et al. (2007)]. Similarly, the state would like to avoid 
the risk of failure of privatising its SOEs. Its primary motive could be to sell rather than 
to maximise the sale proceeds. Thus, firms may resort to downward earnings 
management, which would enable the government to dispose-off SOEs as quickly as 
possible to show the success of its economic policy [Jones, et al. (1999); Chen, et al. 
(2011)].Conservative earnings management may also be used as a means to convince 
unions and labor that privatisation is the only viable option [Boubakri and Cosset (1998)]. 
The political dimension has been a broad consideration in Pakistan through different 
regimes. The sale/divestment of public assets has generally been construed as an 
indicator for the success of a privatisation effort. It is the output, not the outcome, which 
has mattered the most.  
The privatisation  process in Pakistan entails hiring a Financial Advisor or a 
valuator.5If the privatisation process is scrutinised by a third party, the incentive could be 
to follow conservative accounting practices to avoid any bad publicity. Financial advisers 
and chartered accountants themselves would be concerned with the loss of their 
reputation or risk facing civil law suits [Guedhami and Pittman (2011)] if they allow 
aggressive management of earnings. Zhou and Elder (2003) find that big auditing firms 
 
5The valuator is a qualified Chartered Accountant in case of large transactions. 
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and industry specialist auditors have a high correlation with conservative earnings 
management. 
Ahmad-Zaluki, et al. (2008) hypothesise that older companies do not engage in 
upward earnings management as they follow sound business practices and have a 
reputation for following prudent accounting practices. Since SOEs usually have a long 
history of existence, and are subject to public scrutiny by analysts and media, which 
reduces their scope for upwards or downwards earnings management.  
Nagata and Hachiya (2006) argue that retained ownership by management in IPO 
firms creates competing motives between control and wealth creation. On the one hand, 
aggressive earnings management would lead to an overpriced IPO and wealth creation for 
shareholders. Whilst on the other hand, conservative earnings management would lead to 
underpricing of the IPO, oversubscription and a broader allocation of shares to the public, 
which would enable the management to retain control. This argument can be applied to 
units being privatised in stages as retained ownership in such firms would remain with 
the state and its agents, the managers.  
Megginson, et al. (2004) study share issue privatisations (SIPs) and find that 
governments aim to establish and strengthen their equity markets through public market 
privatisations. While our study does not differentiate between asset sale and IPO 
privatisations, it can be hypothesised that in the light of the efficiency gains made by 
privatised firms, there may be an incentive to underprice units being privatised through 
lower discretionary accruals. A lower priced firm would seem a good investment by 
investors and would maintain capital investments within the country (like Pakistan) and 
discourage the flight of capital abroad.  
Finally, in case of Pakistan where managers were not provided job security in the 
post-privatisation period, they may not want their companies privatised so as not to risk 
losing their jobs [Fluck, et al. (2007)].  
Thus we argue that there may be incentives for firms to be more prudent and 
conservative in their use of accounting policies in the pre-privatisation period. Hence, our 
second hypothesis is,  
H2: the management of state-owned companies manages earnings downwards 
before privatisation as a result of conservative accounting practices. 
Our study combines H1 and H2 to formulate a single Hypothesis, H*, i.e. 
µearnings management exists around privatisations in Pakistan¶.  In addition,  
Privatisation Commission of Pakistan considered privatising both profit making 
(supposedly with inflated earnings) and loss making (supposedly with deflated earnings) 
SOEs [Naqvi and Kemal (1991)]. Therefore, we conduct an un-directional test for this 
hypothesis and evaluate the significance of (both upward/downward) earnings 
management. 
 
4.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA SELECTION 
Prior to testing earnings management hypothesis (H*), we examine abnormal 
changes in earnings at or around privatisation of SOEs. For this purpose, we use return on 
assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), and asset-scaled cash flow from operations (ACFO) 
of SOEs and of their matched firms [Barber and Lyon (1996)] from two years before to 
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two years after the privatisation. The matched firm is chosen from the same industry with 
the closest ROA from year ±1 (the year preceding privatisation). While choosing a 
matched firm, we exclude firms that have been privatised in the previous two years to 
avoid any contamination effects.  
Following the estimation of abnormal earnings (if any) in the years around the 
privatisation year, we estimate total accruals by subtracting CFOs from net earnings 
for each year. We use modified Jones model to estimate discretionary accruals that 
are an important tool for manipulating earnings and hence, to detect earning 
management. 
Due to differences in the nature and operations of industries, a variation may exist in 
WKHµQRUPDO¶OHYHOVRIGLVFUHWLRQDU\DFFUXDOV*LYHQWKHSDUWLFXODUF\FOHan industry may be 
SDVVLQJWKURXJKWKHLQGXVWU\ZLGHµQRUPDO¶levels may also change and the absolute level 
of discretionary accruals may not tell us much about the existence of earnings management. 
We, therefore, use the accruals of the matched firm to ascertain whether the discretionary 
accruals of SOEs are significantly different from those of the matched firms.  
The accrual-based model developed by Jones (1991) and modified by Dechow, 
et al. (1995) aims to measure earnings management by segregating total accruals 
(both short and long-term) into the discretionary and non-discretionary components. 
In this model, first coefficients for the components that are susceptible to managerial 
GLVFUHWLRQ VXFK DV µFKDQJH LQ VDOHV UHYHQXH¶ for current accruals DQG µSURSHUW\
SODQWDQGHTXLSPHQW¶ DQGµFKDQJHLQVDOHVUHYHQXH¶IRUWRWDODFFUXDOV) are estimated 
for each industry using ordinary least square regressions. These coefficients are then 
used to calculate non-discretionary current and long-term accruals. Finally, the 
difference between the total current (long-term) accruals and the non-discretionary 
current (long-term) accruals provides discretionary current (long-term) accruals. This 
is explained in more detail in Appendix I. The µdiscretionary component¶ is expected 
to be affected by the management¶V choice of accounting practices, and changes in 
this component are used as the basis for estimating earnings management around 
privatisations. 
Based on the levels of actual total accruals, we deduct the non-discretionary 
portion to calculate the discretionary portion of the accruals. This is done separately for 
both the current and long term components to derive the level of discretionary current and 
long-term accruals for each event-year for the sample and the matched firms. The 
difference between the levels of accruals of two types of firms is the observations that we 
use to conduct the analysis and perform various tests. 
Test observations = Level of discretionary accruals in sample firm  
less Level of discretionary accruals in matched firm 
Using this method, ZH REWDLQ µSRVLWLYH¶ RU µQHJDWLYH¶ YDOXHV IRU HDFK \HDU A 
positive value indicates a higher level of accruals for the event firm compared to the 
matched firm. This implies that the firm has recognised lower levels of expenses this year 
and/or has engaged in accelerating revenue recognition policies. The firm has, therefore, 
PDQDJHG LWV HDUQLQJV LQ DQ µXSZDUG¶ GLUHFWLRQ  6LPLODUO\ D µQHJDWLYH¶ REVHUYDWLRQ 
indicates that the firm has lower levels of discretionary accruals as compared to its 
matched firm. This would result in higher levels of expenses being recognised by the 
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HYHQW ILUP DQGRU GHOD\HG UHYHQXH UHFRJQLWLRQ SROLFLHV 7KLV LQGLFDWHV µGRZQZDUG¶
earnings management.  
We use January 1991 to June 2005 as our sample period. Privatisation 
Commission privatised 158 state owned units during this period.6 We also use the 
following additional criteria for sample selection,  
(1) The privatised unit is a non-financial company; 
(2) The minimum sale price of the unit is Rs 60 million (approximately US$1 
million); 
(3) The minimum ownership stake sold is 5 percent; 
(4) Accounting data is available to apply the modified Jones model for the years ±
1 and 0. 
The first criterion is imposed due to the distinct financial reporting requirements of 
financial companies that lead to the exclusion of 17 firms. In order to draw meaningful 
conclusions from the event of privatisation, it is vital to keep two main characteristics of 
the sample in mind i.e. materiality and controlling ownership as noted in criterion 2 and 3 
above. The larger the amount of the transaction, the greater is the incentive for 
manipulation. Similarly, the larger the stake being sold, the greater is the incentive for 
earnings manipulation as the management would have lesser control over future decisions 
of the firm. The application of these two criteria further reduces our sample to 67 event 
firms. No information was available on the privatisation of two companies that left us 
with 65 event firms. 
Prior studies [such as Teoh, et al. (1998)] use a limit of 10 firms to form the 
relevant industry sample to estimate the regression coefficients from the modified Jones 
model. Given the low levels of public listing in Pakistan, this is a difficult condition to 
satisfy for each and every sample firm. To address this, we form broader industry groups 
similar to Level-3 SIC codes used in the U.S. This classification allows us to increase the 
size of the relative industry and helps in easing the data restrictions we face. We impose 
the restriction of minimum six firms [Iqbal, et al. (2006, 2009)] in each industry to apply 
the modified Jones model. This restriction further reduces our sample size to 40 firms. 
Table 1 and Table 2, respectively, report the distribution of sample firms by industry and 
year, and the industrial and yearly distribution of the amount raised from privatising 
SOEs. 
We examine earnings and accruals over a five year period around the event year, 
that is, two years before to two years after privatisation. Hence, we test the hypotheses by 
analysing the time-series of earnings and discretionary accruals from event years ±2 to +2 
for all the firms. It is for this reason that we examine the operating and accruals 
performance from 1989 till 2007.  
 
6List of Privatisations from 1991 to 2005, available at  http://www.privatisation.gov.pk/. In addition, 
according to the Privatisation Commission of Pakistan website (checked on 18 March 2015), there are only five 
further privatisation transactions over the period 2006-2014 in the non-financial sectors. This further suggests 
that our study did not leave out significant amount of data. We would not have gained significant information 
even if we had extended our sample period to 2012, as we needed two further years of accounting data after the 
privatisation to examine their performance. 
 Earnings Management and Privatisations  87 
 
Table 1 
Distribution (Industrial and Yearly) of Sample Firms, 1991±2005 
Industry 




Energy Edible Oil 
%age of 
Sample Total 
1991 1     2.5% 1 
1992 4 8 4  2 45% 18 
1993 1     2.5% 1 
1994    1  2.5% 1 
1995  1 1   5% 2 
1996  1  2  7.5% 3 
1997        
1998        
1999        
2000    1  2.5% 1 
2001    1  2.5% 1 
2002   2 5 1 20% 8 
2003  1    2.5% 1 
2004  1   1 5% 2 
2005  1    2.5% 1 
%age of the sample 15% 32.5% 17.5% 25% 10%  100% 
Total 6 13 7 10 4 100% 40 
The table provides yearly and industrial distribution of the 40 selected sample firms that were privatised during 




Distribution (Industrial and Yearly) of Proceeds (Millions of Pakistan Rupees) 
Raised from Privatisations during 1991±2005 
Industry 




Energy Edible Oil 
%age of 
Sample Total 
1991 105.60     0.35% 105.60 
1992 904.80 5013.70 1407.90  216.30 25% 7542.70 
1993 69.20     0.22% 69.20 
1994    102.40  0.34% 102.40 
1995  110.00 399.50   1.68% 509.50 
1996  2415.80  10151.00  41.55% 12566.80 
1997       0.00 
1998       0.00 
1999       0.00 
2000    369.00  1.22% 369.00 
2001    142.00  0.47% 142.00 
2002 
  2150.90 2259.40 94.00 
14.90% 
 4504.30 
2003  255.00    0.8% 255.00 
2004  793.00   80.70 2.89% 873.70 
2005  3204.90    10.60% 3204.90 
%age of total 
sample 3.57% 39% 13.08% 43.06% 1.29%  100% 
Total 1079.60 11792.40 3958.30 13023.80 391.00 100% 30245.10 
The table provides yearly and industrial distribution of the proceeds raised  from the 40 sample firms that 
were privatised during the period January 1991 to December 2005. The proceeds are reported in millions 
of Pakistani Rupees. It also reports the percentage of the amount raised  from the sample firms in each 
year and industry. 
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5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We report operating performance (median and mean) results in Table 3 for 33 
SOEs, as we could not find suitable matched firms for the remaining seven. The results 
show that the SOEs start to experience an improvement in their matched-firm adjusted 
operating performance from year ±1, with a peak in year 0 and then deterioration in year 
+1. This pattern is observed for the matched firm adjusted ROA and ROS (mean and 
median) measures of operating performance. At the same time, matched firm adjusted 
asset-scaled cash flow from operations (ACFO) do not show any such pattern. This 
suggests that SOEs may be using income increasing accounting accruals to inflate 
reported earnings at the time of privatisations, as the increase in earnings measures is not 
supported by ACFO. These results are consistent with Teoh, et al. (1998a, 1998b) for U.S 
equities and Iqbal, et al. (2006, 2009) for U.K. equity issues. This warrants further 
analyses of accruals and its components. 
 
Table 3 
Operating Performance of SOEs Around Privatisations 
Year  ±2 ±1 0 +1 +2 
Performance Matched Non-LVVXHU¶V$GMXVWHG52$ 
  Median ±0.43 0.89b 1.45c ±1.24b ±1.18c 
  Mean ±1.83c 1.88b 2.28b ±1.93b ±2.63c 
  Observations 29 33 33 30 28 
Performance Matched Non-LVVXHU¶V$GMXVWHG526 
  Median ±0.36c 0.77c 1.08b 0.45 ±1.24b 
  Mean ±1.21b 1.87b 2.06b ±1.96b ±1.51 
  Observations 29 33 33 30 28 
Performance Matched Non-LVVXHU¶V$GMXVWHG$&)2 
  Median 0.91b 0.73 0.54 1.06c 1.17b 
  Mean 1.17c 1.08 0.89 1.65c 1.98b 
  Observations 29 33 33 30 28 
The table reports mean and median values of three matched-firms adjusted operating performance measures 
based on time series. These are return on assets (ROA±net income divided by beginning of year total assets); 
return on sales (ROS±net income over total sales); and asset-scaled cash flow from operations (ACFO±cash 
flow from operations divided by beginning of year total assets). Matched firm is chosen from the same industry 
as  the privatised firm, with the closest ROA from year t-1 (the year preceding the privatisation year). While 
choosing a matched firm, we exclude firms that have been privatised in the previous two years to avoid any 
contamination effects. Mean values are tested using conventional t-test and medians are tested using Wilcoxon 
sign-rank test.  Superscripts b and c represent significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. 
 
Panel A of Table 4 reports average matched firm adjusted discretionary current 
and long term accruals during two years after and before the privatisation year (year 0). It 
shows that discretionary current accruals are positive and statistically significant in the 
year prior to privatisation (at 1 percent level) and in the year of privatisation (at 5 percent 
level). However, this trend is reversed in the two years after privatisation, which is 
consistent with the reversal of these accruals. Long term accruals are negative and 
marginally significant in years ±1, 0 and +1 and show a trend opposite to that of current 
accruals. 
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Table 4 
Discretionary Current and Long Term Accruals of SOEs Around Privatisations 
Panel A: Matched Firm Adjusted Discretionary Current and Long Term Accruals 
Year (t) ±2 ±1 0 +1 +2 
Discretionary Current Accruals 
  Mean 0.041 0.049a 0.055b ±0.121b ±0.042c 
  SE 0.030 0.019 0.026 0.060 0.024 
  p-value 0.181 0.016 0.046 0.054 0.091 
Discretionary Long-term Accruals 
  Mean 0.043 ±0.073 ±0.197c ±0.148 c 0.169a 
  Standard Error 0.049 0.054 0.108 0.086 0.056 
  p-value 0.384 0.187 0.076 0.096 0.005 
Panel B: Number of Positive and Negative Values of Matched Firm Adjusted 
Discretionary Current and Long Term Accruals 
 ±2 ±1 0 +1 +2 Total 
Discretionary Current Accruals            
No. of Observations 29 33 33 30 28 153 
No. of Positive 
Observations 17 24 23 10 13 87 
Percentage Positive 59% 73% 70% 33% 43% 56% 
No. of Negative 
Observations 12 9 10 20 15 66 
Percentage Negative 41% 27% 30% 67% 57% 44% 
Discretionary Long-Term Accruals 
 
No. of Observations 29 33 33 30 28 153 
No. of Positive 
Observations 16 13 13 10 16 68 
Percentage Positive 55% 39% 39% 33% 57% 44% 
No. of Negative 
Observations 13 20 20 20 12 85 
Percentage Negative 45% 61% 61% 67% 43% 56% 
Panel A of  the Table reports mean values, standard errors, and p-values of matched-firm adjusted discretionary 
current and long term accruals, estimated using the modified Jones model (as explained in Appendix I), for 2 
years before and after the privatisation event. Statistical significance of mean values is tested using conventional 
t-test. Superscripts a, b, and c represent significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels. Panel B 
reports the number and percentages of positive and negative observations of these matched-firm adjusted mean 
discretionary current and long term accruals for each event year.  
 
Panel B of Table 4 shows that out of the 153 sample observations that are available 
over the testing period, we find that, for discretionary current accruals, 87 values are 
positive and 66 are negative. Further examination for each event years shows a tendency 
towards upward earnings management. For example, in year 1 (year prior to 
privatisation), we find that 73 percent (24 out of 33 points) VKRZ µXSZDUG¶ HDUQLQJV
management (positive level of difference between the sample and its matched firm). This 
pattern is reversed in year +1 (year following privatisation) where only 33 percent of 
firms show upward and 67 percent show downward earnings management. This ties in 
with the general observation that earnings management that takes place before an event is 
reversed in the future years, which is reflected in the downward earnings management in 
the post-event years [Teoh, et al. (1998a,1998b)]. 
90 Iqbal, Khan, and Ahmed 
 
Similarly, if we analyse the long term discretionary accruals (those accruing after 
one year) comprising of provisions for depreciation and bad debts, the pattern is pointed 
more towards downward earnings management through the long-term component of 
discretionary accruals. Out of total 153 sample observations, 56 percent (85) show 
negative earnings management. In year 1, we find that 20 (61 percent) out of the 33 
sample points are negative. This could be explained as an attempt to overstate the book 
value of assets in the years preceding privatisation. However in year +1, we see that 20 
out of 30 sample points show downward earnings management. Downward management 
of these components will have a positive effect on the value of assets in the balance sheet. 
Generally, firms try to avoid using long term accruals to manipulate earnings as they are 
relatively easier to identify. 
Given a relatively smaller sample size, we do not draw our results only using mean 
values and conventional tests (for example t-test). As an alternative, we use median 
values of matched-firm adjusted (discretionary current and long term) accruals and 
Wilcoxon¶s sign-rank test. The results of this test are reported in Panel A, Table 5. It 
shows that discretionary current accruals are positive and significant in year 1 and year 
0, and negative and significant in year  +1, which is an indication of the reversal of pre-
privatisation discretionary current accruals.  The significance in year 1 of discretionary 
current accruals is directly in line with our earlier discussion that the incentives for 
earnings management are most intense in the year before privatisation. Even with a one-
tail test for upward earnings management, the above value is significant. This shows that 
there is strong evidence of earnings management via current discretionary accruals in the 
year prior to privatisation. These findings are consistent both with the information 
asymmetry model of Mayers and Majluf (1984) and the implications of studies by Healey 
and Wahlen (1999) and Kothari (2001). 
 
Table 5 
5HVXOWVRI:LOFR[RQ¶V6LJQ-rank Test and Spearman Rank Correlation 
Panel A: Wilcoxon Sign-rank Test 
Year   ±2  ±1  0 +1 +2 
Discretionary Current Accruals 
  Z-score  1.16 1.963b 1.842c ±1.846b ±1.431c 
  Observations 29 33 33 30 28 
Discretionary Long Term Accruals 
  Z-score  0.892 ±1.937b ±1.863b ±1.410 1.767c 
  Observations 29 33 33 30 28 
Panel B: Spearman Rank Correlation 
ROA 





±0.198a ±0.236a ±0.228a 
±0.103c ±0.128b ±0.082 
Panel A of the table reports z-scores and relevant significance using Wilcoxon sign-rank test for matched-firm 
adjusted discretionary current and long-term accruals for five years around the privatisation year (year 0). Panel 
B reports Spearman rank correlation between discretionary current and long term accruals for year ±1 and 
change in matched-firm adjusted return on assets (ROA)  for years 0, +1, and +2. Superscripts a, b, and c 
represent significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels. 
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In addition, discretionary long term accruals are significantly negative in year 1 
and year 0, and positive and significant in year +2 but without showing any specific 
pattern of earnings management. This positive significance of the long term accruals in 
year +2 is, however, harder to understand. This could primarily be attributed to the 
reversal of previous long term accruals or to the discretion available to the post-
privatisation management while restructuring long term provisions.  In privatisations, the 
state shortlists firms for divesture a few years in advance. Given a longer time frame and 
the demand made on the short-listed firms to prepare for privatisation, a substantial 
amount of restructuring can be undertaken. These factors naturally affect the long term 
portion of accruals instead of just current accruals. The management makes sufficient 
provisions for restructuring and exercises its discretion in estimating these amounts. 
Thus, it is not only the current accruals, which may be tampered with, but also the long 
term accruals which provide an opportunity for earnings management. 
Finally, we perform Spearman rank correlation test between discretionary current 
and long term accruals from year 1 and the change in performance matched ROA from 
years 0, +1, and +2. The results reported in Panel B of Table 5 show that the pre-
privatisation discretionary current accruals are significantly negatively related to change in 
performance adjusted ROA from years 0, +1, and +2. This further strengthens our results 
that SOEs use discretionary current accruals in year 1 to inflate reported earnings. 
It is important to note that 3DNLVWDQ¶V HFRQRP\ GLG QRW XQGHUJR DQ\ VWUXFWXUDO
change during the period 2005±2013 [Pakistan (2014)]. The share of agriculture and 
manufacturing in the GDP was 23 percent and 20.6 percent during 2005-06, which 
slightly changed to 21 percent and 20.8 percent during 2013-14 respectively. Following a 
similar pattern, the share of service sector increased from 56 percent to 58.1 percent 
during the same period. This shows that the results presented and discussed above are 
current and relevant even today. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
This study tests earnings management hypothesis around privatisations in 
Pakistan. Our results support the hypothesis that SOEs use upward earnings management 
around the privatisation event. Due to a smaller sample size, we have not been able to 
perform a regression analysis of pre-privatisation accruals and post-privatisation 
earnings. In addition, though our study covers a period from 1991-2005, there have been 
only five further non-financial-sector related privatisations.  We feel that the results of 
our study, though limited to a certain time period, are still pertinent to the future cases of 
privatisations. The paper highlights an entirely different dimension in the context of 
privatisation and should help the Government of Pakistan in better valuation of its public 
sector units offered for privatisation. None the less, this paper makes a significant 
contribution to a field that has not been explored as yet, especially in the context of 
Pakistan. Future studies can draw upon the rationale that we have provided, as the 
incentives are in place for accounting manipulations by the management of SOEs. The 
limitations faced in our study can be attributed to the availability of relevant data, the size 
of each privatised unit, and the number of firms in the industry being studied. Future 
research could be carried out to empirically test the hypothesis in other countries where 
such limitations can be addressed.  
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Our results show that earnings management occurs around privatisations, but it is 
somewhat different from the usual pattern of earnings management reported in prior 
literature.  Numerous studies have established the current component of discretionary 
accruals as being the relevant indicator of earnings management, and time and again it 
has been the current accruals component that has been tampered with by the 
management. While this is the case for privatised firms as well, we also find the long 
term accrual component to be understated in our sample. This is due to the long term 
restructuring provisions that are created before privatisation. Most firms have the leeway 
to adjust the current portion of accruals, but in the case of privatisations, the intention to 
privatise is made clear in advance, so that such provisions provide ample time and scope 
for earnings management. Thus, our paper establishes earnings management in the case 
of Pakistani privatisations via manipulation of both the short term and the long term 
accruals. 
The ability to manage earnings depends strongly on the regulatory structure and 
the degree of information asymmetry.  Stricter scrutiny of firms identified for 
privatisation (such as OGDC, Pakistan Steel, and PIA to name a few) by autonomous 
regulatory bodies can ensure that it is more difficult for firms to manage their earnings 
and hence, window dress their financial statements. Decision makers (bidders) need to be 
aware of the potential for firms to misrepresent their financial situation and engage in 
closer assessment at the time of sale (purchase). Establishing an independent review 
committee and subjecting public sector firms to greater accountability could also reduce 
the degree of earnings management thereby, reinforcing public investor confidence in 
SOEs and in the privatisation policy. 
 
APPENDIX I 
 THE MODIFIED JONES MODEL 
The modified Jones model segregates the accruals into its current and long term 
components. Each of these components is then tested via a two-step process to determine 
the level of discretionary current and long term accruals for each year. The first step 
involves estimating the coefficients through regressions (1) and (2) on the data for each 






















    ... « « « (1) 
where: 
CAC j,t = Current accruals, scaled by beginning total assets for firm j in year t, 
TAj,t±1 = firm j¶VERRNYDOXHRIWRWDODVVHWVDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRI\HDUt, 





































   « « (2) 
TAC j,t = Total accruals, scaled by beginning total assets for firm j in year t, 
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PPEj,t =  firm j¶V JURVV YDOXH RI SURSHUW\ SODQW DQG HTXLSPHQW DW WKH HQG RI
year t 
The second step involves using the same variables for our event firms and matched 
firms to estimate their levels of non-discretionary accruals based on the industry 
coefficients determined in the first step. The modified Jones model adjusts for changes in 
WKHOHYHOVRIDFFRXQWVUHFHLYDEOHV7KHHTXDWLRQXVHGWRILQGWKHILUP¶VQRQ-discretionary 



















NDCAC  « « « (3) 
where: 
NDCAC j,t = Non-discretionary current accruals, scaled by beginning total assets 
for firm j in year t, 
¨5(&MW = Net receivables in year t minus net receivables in year t±1, and 
































aNDTAC  « (4) 
NDTAC j,t = Non-discretionary total accruals, scaled by beginning total assets for 
firm j in year t, and 
aÖ , 1Öb , 2Öb  = Estimates of a, b1, and b2 obtained from Equation (2). 
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